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Abstract
We depart from the assumption of perfect competition in the nal goods sector,
commonly used in cash-in-advance (CIA) models, providing extensive theoretical analy-
sis of the general equilibrium of an economy with imperfect competition, endogenous
production and fully exible prices in the presence of occasionally binding CIA con-
straints, under general assumptions about the velocity of money. Homothetic prefer-
ences generate Marshallian demands which are linear in own price allowing for any
combination of equilibrium number of rms and demand elasticity. Whether the CIA
constraint binds or not depends, among others, on the degree of imperfect competi-
tion. As the market becomes more competitive it is certainly no less likely that the
CIA constraint will bind. The degree of imperfect competition directly a¤ects the dis-
tribution of consumption and indirectly the level of output and work e¤ort via the CIA
constraint. With perfect foresight, there is an optimal negative steady-state ination
rate. We also consider how the introduction of capital and bonds would t into the
framework.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we depart from the assumption of perfect competition in the nal goods
sector, commonly used in cash-in-advance (CIA) models by introducing and exploring an
analytically tractable dynamic general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition with
endogenous production and a money demand that arises from an occasionally binding CIA
constraint.1 We characterize the solution in terms of real and nominal variables both when
the CIA constraint binds and when it does not bind and analyze the conditions determining
which case holds. Monopolistic competition arises in the nal goods sector which comprises
of a nite number of rms facing demand functions obtained from a class of homothetic
preferences. The latter have the property that the Marshallian demand for each product
is linear in own price and satisfy the non-negativity condition of prices and outputs for
any combination of equilibrium number of rms and demand elasticity. Whether the CIA
constraint binds is endogenous and depends on expectations of risk-averse consumers about
the future relative value of money as well as the degree of imperfect competition. We show
that as the market becomes more competitive it is certainly no less likely that the CIA
constraint will bind. The degree of imperfect competition directly a¤ects the distribution of
consumption and indirectly, via the CIA constraint, the level of output and work e¤ort.
We allow for a very general set of possibilities about how the velocity of money is de-
1Cash-in-advance models continue to be widely used in monetary economics, e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2000), Dotsey and Sarte (2000), Adão, Correia and Teles (2003), Ireland (2003, 2005), Bloise and
Polemarchakis (2006), Santos (2006), Evans, Honkapohja, Marimon (2007), Devereux and Siu (2007), Díaz-
Giméneza, Giovannettic, Marimon and Teles (2008), Hromcová (2008), Chen and Li (2008), Alvarez, Atkeson
and Edmond (2009), Giraud and Tsomocos (2010), Adão, Correia and Teles (2011), Telyukova and Visschers
(2011). Some of these papers mainly focus on the case of a binding CIA constraint and constant velocity
of money, e.g. Dotsey and Sarte (2000), Santos (2006), Evans, Honkapohja, Marimon (2007), Chen and Li
(2008), Díaz-Giméneza, Giovannettic, Marimon and Teles (2008).
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termined. It can be constant, increasing or decreasing to a set of arguments which capture
factors such as changes in the production technology and the money supply as well as possible
developments in the system of payments and variation in societys payment habits. Without
imposing any requirement for smoothness or di¤erentiability, we show that velocity has a
specic upper bound which depends on the markup of the marginal product of labor over
the real wage. The upper bound is decreasing with the elasticity of demand of the consump-
tion good, and is reached whenever the CIA constraint binds. Money can have real e¤ects
without requiring the presence of other physical assets or restrictions on how assets are used
for transactions.2 Although the nominal wages and prices are fully exible, we demonstrate
that there are cases where prices exhibit a sluggish response to a change in money supply.
As is well known, the CIA constraint creates a transactions demand for money even
though money provides no utility.3 To see why the CIA constraint might not bind, note
that with uncertainty about the next period, households may choose to hold money at the
end of this period to relax the next periods CIA constraint. In this sense, in a dynamic
model the CIA can give rise to a precautionary or bu¤er-stock motive for holding money
over and above the need to nance the current periods transactions. For higher degrees of
imperfect competition households are more willing to hold a bu¤er stock of money at the
end of the period. This is due to the fact that imperfect competition restricts the share of
household-consumers in aggregate consumption increasing their need for cash to purchase
2Chamley and Polemarchakis (1984) note that a standard argument for money non-neutrality in a general
equilibrium framework lies on the existence of other real assets. Changes in the money supply a¤ect the
price level which in turn a¤ects the return of money as an asset relative to the other physical assets. As
a result, individuals realign their portfolios and the equilibrium holdings of physical assets change. Within
this framework general equilibrium models require heterogeneous beliefs or other frictions.
3This was the rationale behind the rst general formulation of the CIA constraint in Grandmont and
Younes (1972).
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goods which then implies a nonbinding CIA constraint. The rationale for holding money
is inherently dynamic in nature: money is demanded over and above what is required for
nancing current transactions not because it provides a ow of current utility, but because
it increases expected utility in subsequent periods.4
In section 3 we illustrate the scope of the model by looking at the case of perfect foresight.
Perfect foresight removes the precautionary/bu¤er-stock demand for money, but there is still
a potential role for money over and above the current transactions demand. In particular we
are able to provide conditions relating to whether the current CIA constraint binds or not in
terms of the current growth in the money supply or ination and productivity growth. We
show that in a zero-ination steady state (all real and nominal variables are constant), the
CIA constraint always binds. In section 3.1 we consider the general case allowing for non-
zero ination steady-states (all real variables constant, with money and prices growing at a
constant rate). We show that if ination is greater than the discount rate minus one (a small
negative number), the CIA constraint always binds whereas if the relationship holds with
equality the CIA constraint never binds. Since utility is higher in the steady-state with the
nonbinding CIA constraint, it follows that the optimum ination rate here is negative. The
idea is that negative ination provides a real return to nominal money that exactly o¤sets
the e¤ect of discounting. This has obvious similarities to the Friedman (1969) argument for
a negative ination rate made in the context of a money in the utility function approach.
The problem of the monetary authority is not modeled explicitly and money transfers are
treated as random variables (with a known distribution) by rm owners and consumers. For
4In addition, money might be carried over as a store of value (even in the absence of uncertainty) when.the
nominal price of consumption is falling and money has a real rate of return above zero.
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illustrative purposes we assume that the velocity of circulation is an increasing function of
technology and money transfers.5 Then, an increase of money supply increases the probabil-
ity of a binding CIA constraint. We argue that the monetary authority would not necessarily
avoid expansionary money supply because, as we show, there are cases where it might be
welfare improving. When the monetary authority decides the transfer of money, neither the
technology innovation nor the velocity-specic shock are known. Therefore, the transfer may
be optimal ex-ante based on current information and expectations but not optimal ex post,
after technology and velocity shocks are revealed. To keep our analysis simple and tractable
and since our objective is to examine the qualitative aspects of money in conjunction with
monopolistic competition rather than to match features of the data, we abstract from the
presence of physical assets such as capital. Focusing on an economy with primitive nancial
structure also enables us to demonstrate the direct e¤ects of money, rather than those arising
from portfolio choice.6 In section 4, we provide a discussion about how the introduction of
real assets such as capital and bonds might inuence the results.
Cooley and Hansen (1989), introduce a CIA constraint7 in a stochastic optimal growth
model with endogenous indivisible labor and capital, and perfectly competitive markets
assuming that the CIA constraint always binds.8 As suggested in their conclusion (p. 746),
5This assumption is supported by evidence provided in Chiu (2007) and Hromcová (2008).
6The assumption that money is the only asset in the economy is not an unusual one in the literature: e.g.
Lagos and Wright (2003), Lagos and Rocheteau (2005), Santos (2006).
7Svensson (1985), intoduced money via a CIA constraint in a general equilibrium model where other
nancial assets are also traded. Due to the absence of physical capital, the equilibrium consumption always
equals output which is specied as a stochastic endowment process. In such setting, it is unclear whether
output is dependent or independent of monetary expansion. His model is di¤erentiated from that of Lucas
(1982) in that consumers decide on their cash balances before they know the current state of nature and
hence before they know their consumption. This feature leads to potential variation in the velocity of money
as the CIA constraint is sometimes nonbinding.
8The impact of money on real variables results from the ination tax. That is, increases in the growth
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... the most important inuence of money on short-run uctuations are likely to stem from
the inuence of the money supply process on expectations of relative prices. Here, we
establish their argument analytically. When the CIA constraint is nonbinding, the economy
is at its e¢ cient output9 with the Classical feature that money is neutral.10 This happens
when the expected value of money equals its current value (i.e. the expected discounted
relative price of consumption remains unchanged), so that consumers are indi¤erent between
spending a unit of money today and holding it for one period. However, when particular
state vectors occur, the CIA constraint binds because the agents expect that the relative value
of money will decrease next period. As a result, they rush to spend all their money holdings
the current period which leads to an increase in the velocity of money to the extent that it
hits its upper bound. In this case, there is a unique equilibrium where money induces real
e¤ects: equilibrium output, consumption, work e¤ort and real prots are functions of money
balances as well as expectations for the future absolute value of money. The transmission
mechanism for money to have real e¤ects is the presence of the CIA constraint, through
which the level of the price has a direct e¤ect on consumer demand. This can be viewed
as a type of Keynesian e¤ective demand mechanism. Furthermore, we show that (for given
technology) the level of output, hours worked and consumption is less when the CIA binds
than when it is not leading to lower utility. This ine¢ ciently low level of output occurs
rate of money lead agents to expect higher ination. The positive ination tax on the consumption good
induces agents to lower work e¤ort and as a result, output and consumption. In other words, the agents
substitute away from activities that involve the use of cash (consumption good) in favor of activities that do
not require cash (leisure). Among others, Cooley and Hansen (1995, 1997) adopt a similar framework.
9Note that under the assumptions we make, imperfect competition per se does not alter total output or
the labour supply. Rather, it alters the distribution of income between wages and prot.
10In other words, real variables are driven only by current technology innovations, whereas money transfers
and velocity-specic shocks only a¤ect the price level.
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because the binding CIA constraint distorts the intra-temporal work-leisure decision and
discourages work. Furthermore, there is a precise sense in which the current utility is lower
the more the CIA binds.
Alvarez, Atkeson and Edmond (2009), consider a CIA economy where production is ex-
ogenous and output is modelled as a stochastic endowment process. Their assumption that
households are restricted from using funds from interest-bearing accounts for consumption
purposes in every period prevents the CIA constraint from binding at all times thus allowing
the velocity of money to vary.11 A direct implication of this is that prices respond slug-
gishly to changes in money supply because aggregate velocity decreases after an injection of
money. They motivate this feature by presenting correlations between velocity and measures
of money that exhibit a negative relationship. Chiu (2007), on the other hand, provides ev-
idence that cross-country correlations between money and velocity for the OECD countries
are all signicantly positive. We argue that by merely looking at aggregate correlations
in the data, one cannot safely draw conclusions about the direction of the e¤ect of money
growth on velocity because velocity is driven by other factors as well. It is possible that
money velocity exhibits an overall negative relation with money growth despite the fact that
an increase in money supply on its own has a positive e¤ect on velocity. In a recent paper,
Telyukova and Visschers (2011) consider a perfectly competitive economy with endogenous
production and credit where the CIA constraint can be occasionally binding due to the pres-
ence of idiosyncratic preference shocks. They show that there is a threshold value of the
11In the special case where households can use their brokerage account for consumption in every period,
the CIA constraint binds at all times and velocity is constant.
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preference shock above which the CIA constraint binds.12 Another strand of the literature
focuses on nominal rigidities of one kind or another which result in real e¤ects of monetary
policy in the short-run.13
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the economic
environment which includes the problem of the rms, the problem of the workers and the
analysis and discussion of the equilibrium conditions. In section 3 we look at the special
case of perfect foresight and section 4 briey examines how the introduction of capital and
bonds might inuence our results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model Economy
The economy is populated by risk averse workers and monopolistic rms which are owned by
risk-neutral entrepreneurs.14 There are incomplete nancial markets which mean that there
is no source of insurance for workers. There is a perfectly competitive labor market and a
goods market where the workers and the rms trade labor services and the nal good. The
agents exchange goods and labor services using cash which is the only medium of exchange.
As the quantity theory of money indicates, at the aggregate level, nominal output varies
12The binding CIA constraint is achieved by dividing each period into two subperiods and then restricting
the agents to use only cash to purchase consumption in the second subperiod. Due to the presence of capital
and the fact that part of consumption is purchased with credit, there is a wedge between aggregate nominal
consumption (output) and aggregate nominal money balances (i.e. velocity can vary).
13This is the case in the neoclassical synthesis framework (e.g. Don Patinkin 1956) and also the new
neoclassical synthesis (e.g. Woodford 2003).
14The assumption of risk-neutrality for the entrepreneurs is not essential or important but simplies the
exposition.
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with the nominal money balances times its velocity:
M tqt  Ptyt; (1)
where M t is the total quantity of money, qt is the velocity of money, Pt is the aggregate
price level and yt is the aggregate real output. Money velocity is not a choice variable of a
single agent but it is rather determined at the aggregate level. Aggregate output is dened
in terms of consumer preferences over the outputs xi  0 of n > 1 rms with corresponding
price pi. Let x, p 2 <n+ denote the n vectors of outputs and prices. Preferences over x are
represented in their dual form with the homothetic unit cost (price) function
P (p) = +  (  s) ; (2)
where
 =
Pn
i=1 pi
n
, s =
Pn
i=1 p
2
i
n
 1
2
;
and  > 1;  is the absolute value of the elasticity of demand when the prices of all rms
are equal. Notice that (2) implies that when all prices are equal then, pi = s =  = P . This
class of cost functions is dened as Linear-Homothetic (LH), whose properties are described
and derived in full in Datta and Dixon (2000, 2001). Aggregate nominal expenditures are
dened as Y =
Pn
i=1 pixi. Thus, applying Shephards lemma to (2) we can write the share for
good i in total expenditures as pixi=Y = (@P=@pi)(pi=P ). The latter yields the Marshallian
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demand function xi(p):
xi(p) =
(1 + )Y
nP
  Y
nPs
pi
The inverse demand curve is then
pi=
(1 + ) s

  snP
Y
xi
Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), if we assume that n is large and rms treat the aggregate
price level as given (i.e. the indexes P and s) along with aggregate nominal output, this yields
the linear demand function pi = p(xi) = A   Bxi where coe¢ cients A and B correspond
to [(1 + )=]s and snP=Y , respectively and are the same for all rms. LH preferences
have the property that the rms demand curve is linear in its own price treating the general
price indexes as given (as in monopolistic competition). The assumption of monopolistic
competition is very reasonable in a macroeconomic context, where any individual rm is
"small" relative to the whole economy. In terms of (1), nominal income, Y , is determined
by the money supply and velocity, and real output is nominal income divided by the price
index (2) and hence the corresponding outputs of rms x.
2.1 Firms
Each rm produces output by employing a xed number m  1 of workers. Each worker
employed by a rm provides hi hours of work, which produces output via the linear technology
xi(hi;m; ) = mhi, where  > 0 is an exogenous productivity shock common to all frims.
The latter is distributed according to the conditional p.d.f. #(e; 0) for e 2   <+ where
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0 denotes the previous period realized value of . The objective function of rm i can be
written as
i = p (xi)xi   Pwmhi; (3)
where i are prots and w is the real hourly wage rate. The problem of the rm is to
maximize its prots by choosing hours, taking as given the aggregate price level and the real
hourly wage rate. The necessary and su¢ cient condition for prot maximization is
(@xi=@hi)[(@p(xi)=@xi)xi + p(xi)] = Pwm: (4)
We can solve (4) for the labor demand function, nominal price, and nominal prots per
rm as a function of the aggregate variables (A;B; P; w; ):
hdi =
1
2Bm
h
A  P w

i
; pi =
1
2
h
A+
w

P
i
; i =
1
4B
h
A  P w

i2
(5)
Since rms face the same technology shock , the equilibrium will be symmetric. In other
words, in equilibrium all rms will set their price equal to P . Then, the nominal price
equation reduces to w = =, where  = =(   1) is the markup of the marginal product
of labor over the real wage. Labor demand reduces to hd = y=nm while real prots per
rm reduce to  = y=n. Aggregate prots are then  = ni with the share of total prots
in output being  1 < 1. Since all prots are consumed by entrepreneurs, it follows that
total consumption by worker-households is equal to (1   1) y.15 That is, the share of
15Note that the market becomes more competitve as  inceases and/or as n increases.
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consumption by worker-households is determined by the elasticity of demand, with a higher
consumption share with a higher elasticity. Note that whilst we are interested in the e¤ects
of monopolistic competition, it is in no way essential for the non-neutrality of money in this
model: non-neutrality of money due to binding CIA constraints is if anything more likely
to occur if there is perfect competition and all income takes the form of wages.
2.2 Consumption and Worker-Households
Time is discrete and innite, t 2 Z+ = f1; 2:::1g. There are (n x m) worker-households
with preferences over leisure, l, and a Linear Homothetic subutility consumption, c(c) which
is dened over the households consumption of the n goods c 2 <n+, and is represented in
its dual form by (2). The utility function of a representative worker-household is given by
u(ct; lt) = ln ct +  ln lt where  > 0. We can think of the household solving a two stage
budgeting process: rstly choosing total consumption, c, given price P; and secondly allo-
cating this across the n products given prices pi. Each worker-household is endowed with
one unit of time which is split between work and leisure that is, l + h = 1. All worker-
households are identical and face the same prices, so we shall model them as a representative
worker-household (thus avoiding the need for a household subscript and aggregation). En-
trepreneurs have exactly the same subutility function over the consumption of rmsoutput
as do worker-households. However, their utility is linear in the subutility ue(ct) = cet , which
with discounting means that entrepreneurs want to spend all of their prot income on con-
sumption in each period. The entrepreneurs face no CIA constraint. We will henceforth
describe in detail the worker-households problem, and simply note that by market clearing
12
the consumption of the entrepreneurs is equal to prots and given by cet = xt  mct.
The worker-households wealth constraint is given by
M ct+1 + Ptct =M
c
t + t + Ptwtht (6)
where M c 2 <+ are the households nominal money holdings,  is a money increase or
decrease such that M c > jj and Ptct =
Pn
i=1 pticti. The transfer t is made at the end of
period t 1 and before t is realized. It takes a while for the transfer to be completed but the
timing is such that the money is available at the beginning of the period. Households treat 
as a random variable that is distributed according to (e;  0) for e 2 N where  0 denotes the
previous period transfer and N = fe 2 < :  +M c > 0g. The household receives its labor
earnings at the end of the period but purchases consumption at the beginning of the period.
As a result, it faces a cash-in-advance constraint:
Ptct M ct + t (7)
The problem of the household is to choose consumption, labor supply and money balances to
maximize utility subject to the budget constraint and the CIA constraint. We will say that
the CIA is binding whenever Ptct =M ct + t. It is weakly binding when the household does
not wish to consume more; it is strictly binding when the household is constrained to consume
less than it would like to in the absence of the CIA. As in Svensson (1985), money holdings
cannot be adjusted after the state of the economy is known. Unlike Svensson however, the
exogenous current transfer of money in our model can be used to buy current consumption.
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In other words, we do not assume that only money carried over from the previous period is
required to nance current consumption.16
The Bellman equation associated with the households problem is the following:
V (M ct ; t) = maxfu (ct; lt) + EtV
 
M ct+1; t+1

 1t

M ct+1 + Ptct  M ct   t   Ptwtht
  2t [Ptct  M ct   t]g
where  is the discount factor, 1t is the shadow price of the standard budget constraint and
2t is the shadow price of the CIA constraint.
This yields the following necessary and su¢ cient rst-order conditions:
uc (ct; lt) = 1tPt + 2tPt (8)
ul (ct; lt) = 1tPtwt (9)
1t = Et f1t+1 + 2t+1g (10)
Notice that in equilibrium, M ct =Mt. Combining (8), (9) and (10) yields
ul (ct; lt)
wt
= Et

uc (ct+1; lt+1)
1 + gpt+1

where gpt = Pt=Pt 1   1 denotes the ination rate in period t. If the CIA constraint does
not bind or is only weakly binding in period t (i.e. 2t = 0), the left-hand side of the
above condition is also equal to the marginal utility of consumption, which implies that the
16See Walsh (2003, chapter 3.3) for a discussion of alternative assumptions under the CIA constraint.
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marginal benet of work will equal the marginal cost of work, i.e. uc (ct; lt) wt = ul (ct; lt).
On the other hand, if the CIA constraint is strictly binding (2t > 0) then the marginal
benet of work will be greater than the marginal cost of work, i.e uc(ct; lt) wt > ul(ct; lt).
Using the fact that utility is separable in consumption and leisure, it is straightforward to
show that money demand is governed by17
Et

uc (ct+1)
uc (ct)

1
1 + gpt+1
8>><>>:
< 1, binding CIA constraint
= 1, nonbinding CIA constraint
(11)
The term [1= (1 + gpt+1)] is the gross return of money, RMt+1  1 + rMt+1.18 The left hand
side of the above condition can also be written as Et

 t+1R
M
t+1

, where  t+1 is the stochastic
discount factor or pricing kernel which is equal to the intertemporal rate of substitution (IRS)
between next period consumption and current consumption. The term on the left hand side
of (11) is the expected return of money measured in next periods utility per unit of current
utility (i.e. it is the expected relative value of money). When consumers expect that the
relative value of money will decrease (i.e. Et

 t+1R
M
t+1

< 1), they spend all their money
holdings the current period and the CIA constraint binds, otherwise (if Et

 t+1R
M
t+1

= 1)
they keep some cash for next period and the CIA constraint does not bind. In the latter
case, the agents are indi¤erent between spending a unit of money today and holding it for
one period whereas in the former case, the agents strongly prefer to spend it today.
17This is the same condition governing money demand in Alvarez, Atkeson and Edmond (2009). In their
model, the condition holds with strict equality when the household carries a strictly positive balance of
money in its bank account into next period. The latter is equivalent to a non-binding CIA constraint in our
model. Note that using the logarithmic utility function, the left hand side of (11) can also be written as
Et[Ptct=Pt+1ct+1] = Et[1=(1 + gpt+1) (1 + gct+1)] where gc denotes the growth rate of consumption.
18Note that rM =  gp= (1 + gp) is non-positive as long as ination is strictly non-negative.
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Dividing (8) over (9) yields:

ct
1  ht =
1t
1t + 2t
wt (12)
When 2t = 0 and the CIA constraint for that period is not binding or weakly binding,
this is the usual intra-temporal condition which states that the marginal rate substitution
(MRS) between leisure and consumption equals the real wage. However, when the CIA
constraint is strictly binding with 2t > 0, the MRS is lower than the real wage, so that for
given consumption the labor supply ht is lower.19 Consumption will be lower as well when
2t > 0 (the income e¤ect) which will tend to increase ht, but since the real wage remains
constant the overall e¤ect on the labor supply is negative. One way of understanding the
leisure-consumption distortion when the CIA constraint binds is that the household switches
from consumption which is constrained by CIA to leisure which is not: the CIA in e¤ect
acts as a tax on consumption.
We can see that the behavior of the household divides into two regimes. In one regime
(CIA constraint nonbinding or weakly binding) 2t = 0 and the household behaves in the
standard way (it can demand and supply as much as it wants to at market prices and wages).
In the other regime 2t > 0, the household is constrained in its ability to consume at the
prevailing price: it would like to consume more given the price, but is unable to do so. This
is an e¤ective demand constraint : with a CIA constraint, the desired consumption can only
become e¤ective if there is the cash to execute it. This spills over into the labor supply
19Condition (12) can be rewritten as ht = 1 (1+2t=1t)(=wt)ct so that for a given level of consumption,
labor supply is lower when 2t > 0.
16
decision, reducing the level of labor supply. There is less incentive to work now and increase
income which cannot be spent this period only to generate more cash for next period when
it is not needed. This is a very "Keynesian" e¤ective demand mechanism, as was found in
the earlier literature on non-Walrasian equilibria.20
2.3 Equilibrium with an Occasionally Binding CIA Constraint
In equilibrium, all rms produce the same quantity, make the same prot (i.e. all entrepre-
neurs consume the same quantity) and all household-consumers consume the same amount
of the product purchased from each rm. Whilst we have treated qt as given at the house-
hold level, we now need to dene the aggregate relationship which determines the velocity of
circulation. The latter is determined by institutional factors such as the system of payments
and the monetary policy regime () as well as the payment habits of the society and the
production technology (). To capture developments in the system of payments and changes
in the payment habits we introduce a velocity shock 't which has an initial condition '1 and
the conditional p.d.f.  (e';'0) for e' 2   <+ where '0 denotes the previous period real-
ized value of '. Then, economic fundamentals are represented as a sequence of productivity
levels, money supplies and velocity shocks ft;Mt; 'tg1t=1 that evolve according to #,  and
 and the initial conditions f1;M1; '1g.
Assumption The velocity of circulation is determined by the function: qt 2 Qt:  x  x
N ! (0; qb] which we can write as qt = q(t; 't; t); where qt is a unique potentially
20See for example Clower (1965), Leijonhufvud (1968), Benassy (1975), Malinvaud (1975). However, unlike
these older papers, the phenomenon in the present model is very much dynamic and intertemporal rather
than resulting from static and ad hoc rationing constraints that arise from exogenous xed prices.
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time variant scalar :
Thus, we allow for a very general set of possibilities about how the velocity is determined:
there is a general function which relates the velocity qt to the two shocks determining t;Mt
as well as a possible velocity-specic shock. The assumption allows for the velocity to be
constant, or to be decreasing or increasing in its arguments and there is no requirement for
smoothness or di¤erentiability. An equilibrium consists of a sequence pairs of fwt, Ptg1t=1
that clear the labor and the goods market (recall that w is the real wage and P is the nominal
price of output) given the economic fundamentals ft;Mt; 'tg1t=1. Associated with fwt, Pt,
t, 't, tg1t=1 are the sequences fqt, 1t, 2t, yt, ct, ht, tg1t=1.
We can characterize the equilibrium sequence by dividing it into two possible states: one
where the CIA constraint is binding, and one where it is not. Of course, how this divides up
will depend on the sequence of productivity, monetary and velocity-specic shocks. The two
extremes are that the CIA constraint is always binding (as in Cooley and Hansen, 1989), or
never binding. The following propositions allow us to determine how the economy behaves
in the case of an intermittently binding CIA constraint.
For all t, the real wage is related to the current productivity level by the markup equation,
wt = t=. The nominal price Pt thus becomes the key variable for establishing equilibrium
in each period. A useful way to sort the sequence into binding and nonbinding is to note
that there is an upper bound to the velocity of circulation: the CIA constraint binds only
when this upper bound is reached.
Proposition 1 For all t there is an upper bound qb =  on the equilibrium qt. The CIA
18
constraint binds at time t when qt = qb and it does not bind at time t when qt < qb.21
All proofs are in the appendix. The intuition behind Proposition 1 is clear. Firstly, the
upper bound on the velocity comes from two sources: the CIA constraint (7) itself, and
the proportion of expenditure which is not subject to the CIA constraint (the expenditure
of entrepreneurs which equals prots). Turning to the CIA constraint, if there were no
prots ( very large) then worker-household consumption equals output and (7) becomes
Ptyt  M ct + t, which implies by denition that qb = 1. However, since the entrepreneurs
spend all of their prots and are not subject to the CIA constraint, the latter only applies to
that portion of output which is consumed by workers. A higher markup implies a greater share
of prots, and thus for a given output a lower share of consumption by worker-households and
hence a higher overall velocity is possible. For  close to 1, prots take up nearly all output
and the CIA constraint only applies to a very small proportion of output, which allows the
velocity to be very large. If the CIA constraint applied both to workers and entrepreneurs,
then the share of prots would not matter and we would have no dependence of velocity
on  : qb = 1. However, it seems more reasonable to assume that entrepreneurs are not so
constrained. Hence, this "prot share e¤ect" means that the upper bound of qt is decreasing
with the elasticity of demand of the consumption good (i.e. dqb=d =  1= (   1)2 < 0) or
equivalently, it is increasing with the markup of marginal productivity over the real wage.
21Recall that whether the CIA constraint binds or not depends on the expectation about next periods
relative value of money (condition 11). This expectation is conditional on the current state of the economy.
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Proposition 1 enables us to partition time into two sets: times when the CIA constraint
is strictly binding, and times when it is not strictly binding:22
B =t 2 Z+ : 2t > 0 and qt = qb	 ; NB =t 2 Z+ : 2t = 0 and qt  qb	
Now, we can dene the proportion of periods in which the CIA constraint is binding. If
we dene for any T 2 Z+
B(T ) = ft 2 f1; 2:::Tg : t 2 Bg
and likewise NB(T ), we can dene the proportion of times the CIA constraint binds until
T :
P(B; T ) = #B(T )
T
The stationarity of the conditional distributions of ,  and ' is su¢ cient to ensure that
limT!1P(B; T ) = {, where { 2 [0; 1]. The following Propositions characterize the equilib-
rium price level Pt when the CIA constraint binds and when it does not, and show that for
given fundamentals, the proportion of time in which the CIA binds is non-decreasing in .
Proposition 2 (i)When the CIA constraint does not bind (t 2 NB) there is a unique equi-
librium where Pt = (1 + ) qt
h
Mt+t
t
i
with qt  qb and t  , where t = Zt(Mt+t) ,
22Weakly binding and nonbinding equilibria belong to the same category. Whenever we refer to binding
CIA constraints we imply the strictly binding case.
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Zt = Et
n
uc(ct+1;lt+1)
Pt+1
o
and
uc(ct+1; lt+1)
Pt+1
=
8>><>>:
qb
q(t+1;t+1;'t+1)
1
(Mt+1+t+1)
for (t+ 1) 2 NB
1
Mt+1+t+1
for (t+ 1) 2 B
:
(ii) When the CIA constraint binds (t 2 B) there is a unique equilibrium where Pt =
(1 + t) q
b
h
Mt+t
t
i
with t > .
The interpretation of Proposition 2(ii) is that the CIA constraint binds when the expected
return on savings is su¢ ciently low. Note that Zt is the discounted expected marginal utility
that $1 saved now can buy next period. When Zt is low, and hence t is high, the return to
saving is so low that the worker-household wants to spend all of its cash balances now. The
CIA constraint prevents the worker-household from borrowing to smooth its consumption
as much as it would like to. The critical value of Zt at which the CIA binds is dened in the
following corollary:
Corollary 1 Let Zt = (Mt + t)
 1. The CIA constraint strictly binds at time t when Zt <
Zt (and hence, Zt (Mt + t) = =t < 1); and does not bind when Zt  Zt, (and hence,
Zt (Mt + t) = q
b=qt  1).
Zt is the return on savings that exactly equates the marginal utility of current con-
sumption to the expected discounted marginal utility of next-period consumption when the
household spends all of its current money balance.23 If Zt falls below this critical level, then
the CIA constraint binds and the worker-household is prevented from lowering its marginal
23With logarithmic utility, uc(ct) = (Mt + t)
 1 when all current balances are spent.
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utility of current consumption by increasing its current consumption. It is clear that this is
an intertemporal phenomenon which depends on expectations about what is going to hap-
pen next period: indeed, since the CIA constraint can bind in the future it may involve
expectations into the innite future.
Corollary 1 also indicates that the velocity of circulation is related to the expectations
about the future state of the economy via Z as qt = qb=Zt (Mt + t). Since a current change
in money supply (t) a¤ects expectations about the future value of money (Zt), velocity can
be constant, increasing or decreasing in money supply. The direction of the e¤ect of t on
qt depends on how changes in money supply a¤ect expectations. This is consistent with our
assumptions about the functional form of velocity. For instance, if an expansionary money
supply generates expectations for a decrease in the value of money next period, then it is
possible that an increase in  causes an increase in velocity.
Corollary 2 When t 2 NB and the CIA constraint weakly binds then, Zt (Mt + t) = 1,
 = t and qt = q
b.
The implications for the CIA constraint on nominal prices and real output can be seen
if we rewrite the expression for the price level using the explicit functional forms:
Pt =

qb
t
 
(Mt + t) +

Zt

for t 2 B
The equilibrium price level is not proportional to the current money-supply Mt + t due
to expectations =Zt > 0. To show this let t =  (t)Mt and Zt 2

; ; 

such that
0 <  <  <  and  (t) to denote the percentage e¤ect of t on Pt. If  (t) is the
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percentage e¤ect of t on =Zt such that  (t) 2

; 0; 

with  < 0 <  and = = 
1 + 

= < = < (1 + )= = = then
 (t) =  (t)
Mt
Mt +


+  (t)


Mt +


for t 2 B
Even if a change in money supply does not a¤ect expectations (i.e.  (t) = 0),  (t) <  (t)
because =Zt > 0. In other words, a 10% higher money-supply implies a higher price, but
one which is less than 10% higher. When a change in money supply leads to expectations
for higher absolute value of money (i.e.  (t) = ) then the percentage increase in the price
level,  (t), is even smaller than in the case of  (t) = 0. Note that if (t  1) 2 B then
 (t) is the time t ination rate which is due to the change in money supply. Therefore,
there are cases where the price level responds sluggishly to a change in money supply.
Proposition 2 also indicates that the binding CIA constraint implies a non-neutrality of
money. It is straightforward to show that output and consumption respond negatively to the
CIA constraint (see proofs of Propositions 1 and 2):
yt =
nm
1 + !t
t, ct =
yt
nmqb
, ht =
1
1 + !t
, t =
yt
n
where !t = t for t 2 B and !t =  for t 2 NB. The strength of the CIA constraint
is reected in how big t is (since it is inversely related to Zt). In the absence of CIA
constraint, when Zt = Zt from proposition 2(ii) and corollary 1, we have t  ; when
the CIA constraint binds we have t > . Hence, output, employment and prots are all
lower with a binding CIA constraint than without. This is intuitive, since the restriction of
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consumption directly reduces output and hours per worker (from the production function
and labor market equilibrium) and prots (via the markup equation). Hence, if we compare
outputs in times with the nonbinding constraint (where output is at its e¢ cient level yt )
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and when it is binding we have:
yt =
nm
1 + 
t = y

t for all t 2 NB and yt =
nm
1 + t
t < y

t for all t 2 B
If we compare any two periods with the same productivity level, we can say that the
nonbinding equilibrium Pareto dominates the binding equilibrium in terms of the current
ow in utility and prots. Furthermore, we can say that if we have two periods with the
same productivity in which the CIA constraint binds, the one with the smaller t dominates
the other.
Proposition 3 (i) For any t1 2 B and any t2 2 NB such that t1 = t2 then u (t2) > u (t1)
and  (t2) >  (t1). (ii) For any t1; t2 2 B such that t1 = t2 , if t1 > t2 then
u (t2) > u (t1) and  (t2) >  (t1) :
The role of imperfect competition matters in this model because entrepreneurs are as-
sumed to be una¤ected by the CIA constraint. The proportion of expenditure in the economy
covered by the CIA constraint is increasing in the elasticity of demand (decreasing in the
markup). We can now consider two economies that are identical in terms of the economic
24Note that with the utility function assumed for the worker-household, the income and substitution e¤ects
of the real wage exactly o¤set each and there is no direct e¤ect of the degree of imperfect competition or
productivity on equilibrium labor supply. In this case, it is only the CIA constraint that can alter employment
and reduce output below its e¢ cient level. As shown in Proposition 4 there is an indirect e¤ect of the degree
of imperfect competition on labor supply, operating via the CIA constraint.
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fundamentals over time, but which di¤er in the degree of imperfect competition. We can
show that the CIA constraint cannot bind for a lower proportion of the time in a more
competitive economy.
Proposition 4 Consider 1 and 2 with corresponding sequences of equilibria and resultant
{1 and {2. If 1 > 2, then {1  {2.
As the market becomes more competitive (as lim !1 qb = 1), it is "more likely" that the
CIA constraint will bind (or certainly no less likely). It needs to be stressed that Proposition
4 does not imply that in a perfectly competitive market the CIA constraint will always bind.
Whilst it is possible that the CIA constraint will be binding all the time and NB = ?,
it is also perfectly possible (see Proposition 10(ii)) that in the competitive case the CIA
constraint may never (strictly) bind and hence B = ?.25 However, what is clear from the
proof of Proposition 4 is that for some pairs (1; 2), {1 < {2.
Proposition 4 implies that as the market becomes more competitive, it becomes "more
likely" that output will be lower than its e¢ cient level. Although this may sound counter-
intuitive, it is justied by the presence of the CIA constraint which a¤ects the portion of
consumption being subject to the CIA constraint. As the elasticity of demand () increases,
rms face tougher competition, and the markup they charge reduces (i.e. the monopoly
power of the rms decreases). Firm owners are worse o¤ by increased competition because
(i) their share in aggregate production decreases and (ii) aggregate production is lower than
its e¢ ciency level when the CIA constraint binds. On the contrary, worker-households face
25Cooley and Hansen (1989), assume that the consumption good is traded in a perfectly competitive
market. They establish the condition under which the CIA constraint binds and they assume that this
condition is met at all times. This condition is a version of the condition established in Corollary 1.
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a tradeo¤ between lower output when the CIA constraint binds and increased share in ag-
gregate production. When the latter dominates the former, worker-households are better o¤
from increased competition.
We now show that monetary policy depends on the degree of competition. Two economies
characterized by di¤erent degrees of competition but identical in all other respects will
have di¤erent monetary policies, fMtg1t=0, unless they have di¤erent expectations about the
evolution of money supply, . For simplicity we have assumed that the transition probabilities
of money transfers depend only on the previous realization of the transfer. However, this
assumption does not play a crucial role and the analysis can be easily extended when the
transition probabilities have a more complex functional form and/or depend on other factors.
Let  denote the conditional cumulative distribution of . Then, the following proposition
holds.
Proposition 5 If for any a and b such that when a < b, q (a) < q (b) then, for
a given sequence ft;Mt; 'tg1t=1, probability distributions # and , and 1 and 2
with corresponding cumulative distributions 1 and 2 such that 1 > 2: (i) when
t (1) 2 NB then t (2) 2 NB and 1 rst-order stochastically dominates 2, (ii)
when t (1) 2 B then t (2) 2 B and 2 rst-order stochastically dominates 1.
In section 3, we analyze the case of perfect foresight and show (proposition 7) that for low
(negative) growth rates of money supply the CIA constraint does not bind whereas whenever
the CIA constraint binds the growth rates of money supply is above a certain threashold.
This motivates the assumption that velocity is an increasing function of money transfers. If
this is the case, then for a given sequence ft;Mt; 'tg1t=1 and probability distributions # and
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, as the market becomes more competitive, it is relatively more likely that the growth rate
of money will increase when the CIA constraint does not bind and relatively less likely that
it will increase when the CIA constraint binds. Monetary policy is optimal in the sense that
given transition probabilities, the sequence of money transfers is such that it satises the
householdsand rmsoptimal conditions. If the transition probabilities for money transfers
are the same in the two economies with di¤erent degrees of imperfect competition then, for
each economy there will be a di¤erent sequence of money transfers satisfying the optimal
conditions.
2.4 Discussion
Propositions 1-5 show that in this simple economy, we can divide time into two regimes. In
one, where the CIA constraint does not bind, we live in a Classical world where real vari-
ables are given by their optimal level (conditional on current productivity and the presence
of monopolistic competition), prices adjust instantaneously to current shocks in velocity,
productivity or the money supply. In the other regime, the CIA constraint binds, and out-
put falls below its optimal level. Households see the expected marginal utility of their money
holdings falling to a very low level in the next period: perhaps they expect a high nom-
inal price next period (or a productivity boom) and would like to increase their current
consumption to lower their current marginal utility. However, they run into the CIA con-
straint: markets clear, but at a lower level of output and consumption. The nominal price
that equates the cash-constrained demand with the supply is higher than in the classical
regime (Proposition 2(ii)). Prices are perfectly exible, but in this Keynesian regime where
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the CIA constraint binds there is an e¤ective demand e¤ect: the price-level itself inuences
the way the CIA operates.26 In essence, there are two forces operating in response to the
low value of expected marginal utility per $ next period: on the one hand, the current price
rises to reduce the current marginal utility per $, on the other hand the households are try-
ing to increase their consumption. Since the CIA constraint prevents them from increasing
consumption enough, the equilibrium market clearing nominal price is higher than it would
have been in the absence of the constraint.
Why does not the price adjust downward to avoid the CIA e¤ect and let the household
raise its current consumption su¢ ciently? The answer is in the general equilibrium: the
maximum output that the economy can produce under voluntary trade is given by yt . With
a lower price than that given by Proposition 2(ii), the demand of the consumer would exceed
the supply. With the lower prices the worker-household would be wanting to consume more
than it was willing to produce through supplying its own labour (given that a proportion of
output goes to entrepreneurs). So higher current prices are consistent with both the current
equilibrium in goods and labor markets, and also ensure that the inter-temporal equilibrium
holds given the CIA constraint.
To make matters concrete, for illustrative purposes, let us assume that the velocity of
circulation is an increasing function of  and .27 This assumption is not short of empir-
26When the household is operating under a CIA constraint, its demand curve becomes a rectangular
hyperbola rather then the normal demand.
27This is a special case of a velocity function where qt = q(t
+
; t
+
). Alvarez et al. (2009), provide evidence
that the correlation between measures of money and velocity is negative. However, this does not necessarily
imply that money supply is the dominant factor that drives velocity. This can be illustrated beyond the
context of the current model. For instance, suppose technology is the dominant factor of velocity and that it
a¤ects it positively. Then, if technology deteriorates, it is reasonable to assume that the monetary authority
increases the supply of money to boost the economy. In this case, even though money transfers a¤ect velocity
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ical support: Chiu (2007), provides evidence for the positive relationship between velocity
and money while Hromcová (2008) provides evidence for the positive relationship between
velocity and quality of technology in production. It follows that for a massive monetary
expansion or a substantial technology improvement or a combination of the two, the CIA
constraint will then bind because the agents expect that the value of money next period will
be smaller than the value of money the current period (see condition, 11). As a result, they
rush to spend all their money holdings the current period which increases the velocity of
money to the extent that it hits its upper bound. Then, equilibrium output, consumption,
work e¤ort and prots, all depend on the current money supply as well as expectations for
future money transfers, technology innovations and velocity-specic shocks.
In general, a higher level of technology would imply a higher welfare. In addition, for any
given technology level, a binding CIA constraint implies a lower welfare than a nonbinding
CIA constraint (Proposition 3). A higher level of technology would also imply a higher
probability of a binding CIA constraint (under our illustrative assumption). If the CIA
constraint binds, larger money transfers will, in general, increase the welfare. The monetary
e¤ect on real quantities comes through variable . The smaller  is the higher the welfare
of both consumers and rm owners. There are two channels through which money transfers
can a¤ect , a direct channel in which there is a negative relationship between  and , and
an indirectchannel (through Z) in which the direction of the relationship is not obvious
because it depends on the expectations of consumers about next periods value of money.
positively, overall money supply and velocity exhibit a negative correlation. Therefore, by just looking at
correlations between money and velocity we cannot safely draw conclusions about the relationship between
velocity and transfers.
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The latter depends on the conditional probability distributions of ,  and '. Assuming that
the direct e¤ect of  on  dominates the indirect e¤ect, an increase in the supply of money
decreases  and thereby, increases welfare along a binding CIA constraint.
Note that when the monetary authority decides the transfer t; the values of t and 't
are not known. For a given technology innovation and velocity-specic shock the monetary
authority can increase the likelihood of a binding CIA constraint by transferring a large
amount of money to the agents. A binding CIA constraint can occur even with moderate
levels of technology. If such a case occurs then, according to Proposition 3, the welfare for
both rm owners and consumers will deteriorate.28 The monetary authority cannot entirely
prevent the CIA constraint from binding because the condition that determines a binding
CIA constraint does not depend only on  but also on  and ', which are not under the
control of the monetary authority. One may argue that the monetary authority should
keep money supply constant, making zero transfers, in order to decrease the likelihood of
a binding CIA constraint. Variation in the supply of money however does not necessarily
make the consumers worse o¤. As mentioned above, there might be values of  (within
the set of equilibria with binding CIA constraints) that make the agents better o¤. In the
absence of velocity shocks, if there was no time lag between the decision of the transfer
and the realization of technology innovation then the monetary authority could have made
appropriate transfers so that the agents achieve the highest level of welfare for any realization
of . Furthermore, due to the time lag between decision from the monetary authority and
consumers receiving the transfer as well as other possible frictions there is no guarantee
28If the CIA constraint did not bind utility and real prots would have been higher at the same level of
technology.
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that the full amount of the transfer as decided by the monetary authority will reach the
consumers. Even if the monetary authority commits to a certain sequence of transfers, the
uncertainty that consumers have about the transfers exists and is justied. Consequently,
in a stochastic environment, the monetary authority cannot achieve with certainty a non-
binding CIA constraint.
An example of welfare improving expansionary money supply
For simplicity, we abstract from velocity-specic shocks (i.e. qt 2 Qt: N x  ! (0; qb]).
Let  = [1, 2, 3]
0 2 <3+ and  = [1, v2, 3]0 2N3 be vectors containing the possible values
of  and , respectively. Specically, 1 < 2 < 3 and 1 < v2 < 3. The 3 x 3 transition
matrices of  and  are denoted by # and , respectively. Consider the following case:29
state 3, 1 3, 2 3, 3 2, 1 2, 2 2, 3 1, 1 1, 2 1, 3
CIA const. binds yes yes yes no no yes no no no
Notice that having a high  increases the likelihood of a binding CIA constraint which
is a welfare inferior outcome as regards to the current welfare of the agents for any given
level of technology. Nevertheless, the monetary authority will not necessarily choose a low
value of  in order to decrease the probability of a binding CIA constraint. If 3 occurs the
CIA constraint will bind no matter what  is. Then, it could be the case that among the
binding CIA-constraint equilibria,  (3; 3) <  (3; 1) where 1 < 3. The latter implies
that both current prots and current utility are higher under 3 than under 1; as shown in
29Suppose the economy is at state (k; f ) then, Zt (k; f ) = 
P3
j=1
P3
i=1 #kjfj
qb
q(i;j)
1
Mt+vf+j
, where
#ij and ij are the ith, jth elements of matrices # and , respectively. Note also that qt is such that
qt = q
b=Zt(Mt + t) when the CIA constraint does not bind and qt = qb when the CIA constraint binds.
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the proof of Proposition 3: du=d < 0 and d=d < 0. Whether  (3; 3) is smaller than
 (3; 1) depends on the expectations of consumers about the future value of money (Z).
Consequently, there might be a scenario where there is a trade o¤ between choosing a low
value of  that reduces the probability of a binding CIA constraint and a high value of 
that increases welfare among binding CIA-constraint equilibria.
3 The Special case of Perfect Foresight
In this section, we analyze the case where agents have perfect foresight. With perfect fore-
sight, there is no role for money as a bu¤er-stock: its only potential role is as a store of value
and medium of exchange. Whilst this is very much a simple and special case, we can see how
the framework we have set up can shed light on the possibilities contained in Propositions
1-2. Firstly, we will dene a zero ination steady state. For a steady-state to be possible, we
have to assume that there are no shocks: t = b; t = 0; 't = b'. Given there are no shocks,
all real and nominal variables are assumed constant.
Denition of zero-ination steady state: For ft = b; t = 0; 't = b'g1t=1, qt = bq,
1t = b1, 2t = b2, yt = by, ct = bc, ht = bh, wt = bw, Mt = cM , Pt = bP and t = b.
Proposition 6: At the zero-ination steady state, when  2 (0; 1), the CIA constraint
always strictly binds, with b2 > 0; bq = qb, and bP = [1 +  (2  )] bq hcMb i. Then, real
variables are given by: by = nm
1+(2 )
b, bc = by
nmqb
, bh = 1
1+(2 ) , b = byn .
So, in steady-sate with zero-ination no one will want to hold money at the end of the
period. Since consumption is constant, the discounted marginal utility of consumption next
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period is always less than current marginal utility, so that with a zero rate of return on money
holdings, a $ today will always buy more utility than a $ tomorrow. This implies that the
velocity of money will always be at its upper bound (since there are no velocity shocks, this
is constant). The level of output in steady-state is less than would occur when the CIA is
nonbinding, but only very slightly. The ratio of steady-state output and employment to the
e¢ cient level is: by
y
=
bh
h
=
1 + 
1 + + (1  ) < 1
Clearly, if we are dealing with quarterly data, then  = 0:995  1 and the ratio is close to
unity. For example, with  = 1; this level of discounting gives us a ratio of 0:9975 (4 s.f.).
This slight ine¢ cieny is caused by the distortion of the work-leisure decision that occurs
when the CIA constraint binds: the consumption-leisure MRS is less than the real wage, so
that the supply of labor is lower (for a given level of consumption). To see why the CIA
constraint needs to strictly bind, assume instead that it was weakly binding with bq = qb
and ^2 = 0: in this case, the household could increase its utility by bringing forward some
consumption (since  < 1) and hence, the steady-state is only sustainable with ^2 > 0.30
Now we consider the general case where consumer-households and rm-owners perfectly
foresee the evolution of the economic fundamentals f't; t; tg1t=1.31 Let gjt = (jt=jt 1)   1
denote the growth rate of variable j at time t. We turn rst to the growth rate of the nominal
money supply.
Proposition 7: In the economy with perfect foresight : (i) when t 2 B then gMt+2 >    1
30Notice that the Euler equation implies that  = b1=(b1 + b2) which holds only if b2 > 0 since  < 1.
31The analysis of the perfect foresight equilibrium can be generalized to the case of non-stable state
variables.
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but the reverse does not always hold, and (ii) when gMt+2     1, then t 2 NB but
the reverse does not always hold.
Cooley and Hansen (1989; p. 736), argue that in their model gMt+2 >  1 is a su¢ cient
condition for the CIA constraint to be always binding. In our model, gMt+2 >    1 is not a
su¢ cient condition for the CIA constraint to be always binding due to the fact that velocity
is allowed to vary. Note that conditions gMt+2 >    1 and gMt+2     1 can be rewritten
as gt+1 > [(Mt+t)=t]( 1) 1 and gt+1  [(Mt+t)=t]( 1) 1, respectively.32 The
two conditions can also be written as t+1 > (Mt + t)(   1) and t+1  (Mt + t)(   1),
respectively. Since  2 (0; 1), the latter shows that both binding and nonbinding CIA
constraints are consistent with both positive and negative money transfers.
For any T 2 Z+ [ f0g, let us dene sets eB(T ) = ft  T + 1 : t 2 Bg and gNB(T ) =
ft  T + 1 : t 2 NBg such that B(T ) \ eB(T ) = ?, B(T ) [ eB(T ) = B, NB(T ) \ gNB(T )
= ?, NB(T ) [gNB(T ) = NB, B(0) = ?, NB(0) = ?, eB(0)  B and gNB(0)  NB. In
addition, let us dene the following the auxiliary setsM(T ) = ft  T + 1 : gMt+2     1g
and M>(T ) = ft  T + 1 : gMt+2 >    1g. Then, using proposition 7 and its proof we
can dene the mutually exclusive sets gNB1(T ) = t 2M(T ) : t 2 NB	 and gNB2(T ) =
t 2M>(T ) : qt+1 < qt  qb; t 2 NB
	
such that gNB1(T ) \gNB2(T ) = ? and gNB1(T ) [
gNB2(T ) = gNB.33 The second part of proposition 7 indicates that if the growth rate of
money is always less or equal than    1 from any t 2 Z+ onwards, the CIA constraint will
never bind again. The case ofM>(T ) = ? or gMt+2    1 with  2 (0; 1) for all t  T +1
32Refer to the proof of proposition 7.
33These relationships do not necessarily hold in the stochastic model.
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holds only if gMt+2 >  1 for all t  T + 1.34 Therefore, whenM>(T ) = ?, it must be that
 1 < gMt+2     1. Proposition 7(i) also indicates that it is possible that gMt+2 >    1
when t 2 gNB(T ) which occurs when t 2 gNB2(T ).
Corollary 3 In the economy with perfect foresight, for any  2 (0; 1) and any T 2 Z+[f0g :
(i) ?  eB(T ) and (ii) ?  gNB(T ).
Corollary 3 signies that there are sequences of ft; t; 'tg such that (i) the CIA con-
straint never binds and (ii) the CIA constraint always binds. For eB(T ) = ?, the sequence of
money transfers, ftg1t=T+1, can be complemented by sequences of velocity and technology
innovations, ft; 'tg1t=T+1, such that gNB2(T ) 6= ?.
Proposition 8 In the economy with perfect foresight, there are unique values for Pt, yt, ct,
ht and t such that
Pt = (1 + t) qt

Mt + t
t

with
8>><>>:
t = t, qt = q
b and t >  when t 2 B
t = , qt  qb and t   when t 2 NB
yt =
nm
1 + !t
t, ct =
yt
nmqb
, ht =
1
1 + !t
and t =
yt
n
where !t =
8>><>>:
t for t 2 B
 for t 2 NB
with t =
8>><>>:


(1 + gMt+2) for t+ 1 2 B

qb
(1 + gMt+2) for t+ 1 2 NB
Since t >  when t 2 B, for a given technology level, a nonbinding equilibrium Pareto
dominates a binding equilibrium in terms of welfare for both rm-owners and household-
34If gMt+2 <  1, the positivity of money supply will be violated.
35
consumers (Proposition 3). Note that if the CIA constraint binds in period t but is expected
to be nonbinding in t + 1, the upper bound on the qb enters into t. This implies that the
degree of imperfect competition matters: a higher markup implies a higher qb, which implies a
higher output (among binding equilibria for a given technology level). A monetary authority
which is interested in maximizing welfare, will choose the ow of money in every period such
that the CIA constraint never binds. Corollary 3 indicates that this is possible since the
binding set can be an empty set.
Corollary 4 In the economy with perfect foresight, for any t 2 NB, gct+1  gt+1.
Proposition 9: In the economy with perfect foresight : (i) when t 2 NB then gpt+1 

1+gt+1
 1, but the reverse does not always hold, and (ii) when gpt+1 < 1+gt+1  1 then
t 2 B, but the reverse does not always hold.
Corollary 4 indicates that whenever the CIA is nonbinding, the growth rate of consump-
tion next period cannot be greater than the rate of improvement in technology. As shown
in the proof of proposition 9, when the CIA constraint binds, it is perfectly possible that
the growth rate of consumption next period is greater than the rate of improvement in tech-
nology. This occurs because of an increase in work e¤ort which boosts further the growth
rate of production. In this case the gross ination rate is smaller than =(1+ gt) due to the
fact that t 1  t. From proposition 8, the latter also implies that not only output and
consumption grow faster than the rate of improvement in technology but also real prots.
As proposition 3 (ii) indicates, since t 1  t neither household-consumers nor rm-owners
are worse-o¤ in the transition from period t  1 to period t.
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Corollary 5 In the economy with perfect foresight, (t 1) 2 NB if and only if gpt = 1+gct 1,
otherwise (t 1) 2 B, and gpt > 1+gct 1 : (i) If (t 1) 2 NB and t 2 NB then, gpt =

1+gt
 1
but the reverse does not always hold; (ii) If (t  1) 2 NB and t 2 B then, gpt > 1+gt   1 but
the reverse does not always hold; (iii) If (t  1) 2 B then, gpt > 1+gt   1 or gpt 

1+gt
  1
for any t.
Corollary 5 (i) indicates that if the CIA constraint does not bind in two consecutive
periods, the growth rate of the price level is a function only of the growth rate of technology.
Under those circumstances, as technology improves prices must be falling. Corollary 5 (i)
also demonstrates that if technology remains unchanged when the CIA constraint does not
bind in two consecutive periods, prices decline at the rate 1  .
Corollary 6 In the economy with perfect foresight, (i) If (t   1) 2 NB and t 2 NB then,
gMt+1 =

1+gqt
  1 but the reverse does not always hold; (ii) For any bundle (t   1) and t
other than f(t  1) 2 NB, t 2 NBg, gMt+1 > 1+gqt   1 or gMt+1 

1+gqt
  1.
Money growth on the other hand, along two consecutive nonbinding CIA constraints,
depends on the growth rate of velocity which is a function of the money transfer, technology
and velocity innovation.35 For, Z+(T ) = fT + 1; T + 2; ::1g, it is also useful to partition
time into periods of positive growth rates of technology and times of non-positive growth
rates of technology: G+(T )= ft 2 Z+(T ) : gt > 0 g and G (T )= ft 2 Z+(T ) : gt  0g such
that G+(T )[G (T ) = G(T ). Corollary 5 indicates that for any T 2 Z+ [ f0g and  2 (0; 1)
35If velocity is a continuously di¤erentiable function in all arguments (technology level, money transfer
and velocity innovation) then, gqt = "
q;'
t g't+ "
q;
t gt+ "
q;
t gt where "
q;i
t is the elasticity of velocity with
respect to variable i and gt = gMt+1(1 + gMt)=gMt   1. Then, using corollary 6(i), we can express gMt+1
as a function of gMt, g't, gt and elasticities.
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such that gNB(T ) = Z+(T ), (i) if G+ = Z+(T ) then, gpt < 0 for all t and (ii) if G  = Z+(T )
then gct < 0 for all t.
3.1 Inationary steady-states and the optimal rate of ination
We are now in a position to analyze non-zero-ination steady-states, which we dene as
follows:
Denition of the inationary steady-state For ft = b; t = 0; 't = b'g1t=1, qt = bq,
1t = b1, 2t = b2, yt = by, ct = bc, ht = bh, wt = bw, t = b; gMt = gpt = g^p: for all t.
In the inationary steady-state, money growth equals steady-state ination and all real
variables are constant.36 The presence of steady-state ination means that there is an ina-
tion tax: holding money to nance transactions can incur a cost as prices are rising. This
was of course implicit in Propositions 7-9. We can now state the following:
Proposition 10 Consider an inationary steady-state:
(i) if g^p >    1, then the CIA constraint always strictly binds, with real variables
given by Proposition 8.
(ii) if g^p =   1, then the CIA constraint never binds and the real variables are at the
e¢ cient levels dened in Proposition 8.
(iii) if g^p <    1 then no steady-state exists.
Proposition 10(i) states that output is decreasing with the level of steady-state ination:
a higher ination tax increases the distortion induced by the CIA constraint. If we dene
36In fact we need not assume that the velocity of money is constant: if we allowed for a constant growth
rate of the velocity  1 < gq  0, then the inationary steady state would become gq + gMt = gpt = g^p.
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the welfare corresponding to a constant level of ination as the per period ow of utility in
the corresponding steady-state (and zero if there is no steady-state) then it follows that:
Corollary 7 The optimal steady-state ination rate is g^p =    1:
This result is reminiscent of Friedmans argument that the optimal ination rate is nega-
tive (Friedman, 1969). Friedman adopted a money-in-the-utility-function (MIU) framework:
a negative rate of ination provides a return on money holdings su¢ cient for households to
hold the optimum quantity of real balances. Here, the argument is somewhat di¤erent. The
CIA constraint distorts the economy when it binds strictly: when 2 > 0 the labor supply
is diminished and output and consumption are below their e¢ cient levels. The optimum
ination rate provides a positive return to holding money which exactly outweighs the e¤ect
of discounting and allows for constant consumption without the CIA binding. This removes
the distortion induced by the CIA constraint and allows the economy to produce the e¢ -
cient level of output with the MRS equated to the real wage. Proposition 10 and Corollary
7 can be generalised to allow for steady state growth in output and productivity using the
conditions in Corollary 5.
4 Capital and Bonds
Thus far, we have abstracted from the presence of capital accumulation and assumed that
money is the only asset in the economy. We could introduce capital into our framework by
assuming that it is owned by the worker-household and rented to the entrepreneurs. Even
in the presence of capital, money still contains a savings-based (or precautionary demand)
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component. In other words, the CIA constraint can be nonbinding even in the presence
of capital. To show this, let us assume that capital is a factor of the production function
which can be written as x(ht; kt;m; i). The extended production function satises the usual
properties: xk > 0 and xkk  0 where xk and xkk denote the rst and second derivatives of
x () with respect to k. Moreover, we assume that the agents of this economy accumulate
capital which depreciates at rate . Without loss of generality we also assume that the price
of capital is the same as the price of consumption. Then, the euler condition for capital is
Et
h
uc(ct+1)
uc(ct)

[(1  ) + xk(kt+1; )]
i
=
1  2t Ptuc(ct) + Et
h
2t+1Pt+1
uc(ct)

[(1  ) + xk(kt+1; )]
i (13)
It follows that
Et

uc (ct+1)
uc (ct)

[(1  ) + xk(kt+1; )]
8>><>>:
> 1 for t 2 NB
< 1 or  1 for t 2 B
(14)
while (11) is the corresponding condition for money.37 Conditions (13) and (14), demonstrate
that when there is precautionary demand for money (i.e. the CIA constraint does not bind),
investment demand is low which means that next period stock of capital is low, and as a
result the marginal product of capital is high. Subsequently, the return of capital, measured
in utility units, is expected to increase. In this case, condition (13) indicates that the left
hand-side of (14) is strictly greater than unity because there is a non-zero possibility that
37If capital has a di¤erent price than consumption then the left-hand-side of (13) becomes
Et
h
uc(ct+1)
uc(ct)
 h
Qt+1
Qt
(1  ) + xk(kt+1;)Qt
ii
where Qt denotes the relative price of capital (e.g. Cummins
and Violante (2002), Fisher (2006)).
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the CIA constraint will bind next period. This demonstrates that even in the presence of
capital, money can be used as store of value. If household-consumers knew with absolute
certainty that the CIA constraint next period is nonbinding (i.e. 2t+1 = 0) then, they would
have increased investment demand to the point that the expected utility return of capital
equals the expected utility return of money.
Let us consider the case of a non-zero ination steady state with perfect foresight. If
we had included capital accumulation, then the return to savings (the marginal return to
capital) would be equal to the reciprocal of the discount rate: the optimal ination rate
dened in Proposition 10(ii) would mean that money would have the same rate of return as
capital. The steady-state relationship would give a return to capital of
(1  ) + xk(k; ) = 1

where xk(k; ) is the steady-state marginal product of capital. The real return to holding one
$ is
1
1 + g^p
=
1

What would happen if we included interest-bearing nominal assets such as bonds? If
we assume the usual arbitrage condition between bonds and capital, these will both o¤er
the same real-return on savings equal to the (expected) marginal return of capital. This
will not alter the opportunity cost of holding money from the case of just capital and hence
will not eliminate the precautionary-demand for money in the presence of uncertainty. This
conclusion depends on how liquid we make bonds. If we were to make bonds perfectly liquid,
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then in e¤ect bonds would become an interest bearing form of money and would eliminate
the need for non-interest bearing money. Alvarez, Atkeson and Edmond (2009) make an
intermediate assumption and allow for bonds to be liquid part of the time and allowing the
CIA constraint to be nonbinding. Insofar as bonds are not perfectly liquid, there is still a
potential role for money over and above the transactions demand.
5 Conclusion
The paper lays out a simple framework in a general equilibrium model with money where
the nal good is produced by monopolistic rms via labor services provided by risk-averse
workers. Preferences over consumption are Linear Homothetic and money is introduced by
means of an occasionally binding cash-in-advance constraint. Those preferences generate
Marshallian demands enabling any combination of equilibrium number of rms and demand
elasticity. Money is a liquidity vehicle which has real e¤ects on the economy without requiring
the presence of other real assets or any sort of price rigidity. The velocity of money is a very
general function which corresponds to the monetary policy regime, production technology,
institutional developments and payment habits.
The proportion of periods in which the CIA constraint is binding depends, among others,
on the degree of imperfect competition. We demonstrate that the CIA constraint cannot bind
for a lower proportion of the time in a more competitive economy. We show that the degree
of imperfect competition directly a¤ects the distribution of consumption across workers and
rm owners, and in conjunction with the CIA constraint, the level of aggregate output and
work e¤ort. We enter a Keynesian world only when the expected value of money decreases
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below a critical value and velocity reaches its maximum value. The latter is the case of a
binding CIA constraint which is a welfare inferior outcome for both the workers and the rm
owners as it delivers lower current utility and lower current real prots for any given level of
technology. We argue that even though the monetary authority can increase the probability
of a binding CIA constraint by increasing money supply, expansionary monetary policy can
be welfare improving. We demonstrate that when the CIA constraint binds there are cases
where prices respond sluggishly to changes in money supply. We also show that with perfect
foresight, there is an optimal negative steady-state ination rate as in Friedman (1969) and
consider how the introduction of capital markets t into the framework.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of proposition 1. Suppose the CIA constraint binds. Then, the resource
constraint becomes
yt = nm

Mt
Pt
+
t
Pt

| {z }
CWORKERS
+
1

yt|{z}
CENTREPREUNEURS
which can be rewritten as
yt =

   1nm

Mt
Pt
+
t
Pt

(A.1)
and is equivalent to the quantity theory of money equation, Ptyt = qbM t, where qb 
= (   1).
Next, suppose the CIA constraint does not bind; then, 2t = 0. Substituting out Ptct from
(8) using (6), 1t from (9) using (8), wt from (9) using the markup equation and imposing
the equilibrium condition hst = h
d
t we obtain
Mt+1 =
(1 + ) (   1)
nm
Yt   (   1)Pt

t + [Mt + t]
Using the workers budget constraint the equilibrium consumption can be written as a linear
combination of productivity and real expenditures:
ct =
t

  1
nm
yt
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It follows that the resource constraint becomes
yt =
nm

t   1

yt| {z }
CWORKERS
+
1

yt|{z}
CENTREPRENEURS
The latter and the quantity theory of money equation imply
yt =
nm
1 + 
t , ct =
1
 (1 + )
t and Pt = (1 + ) qnbt

Mt + t
t

Then, since 0 < Ptct < [Mt + t], it must be the case that 0 < qnbt [Mt + t] = < [Mt + t]
which holds only if 0 < qnbt <   qb.
Proof of proposition 2. (i) When the CIA constraint is nonbinding or weakly binding
(t 2 NB) then, qt  qb. It follows that 2t = 0 and the level of output and employment
are determined by the marginal rate of substitution being equal to the real wage. In this
case, equilibrium output and consumption are functions of only t while the price level is a
function of Mt, t, 't and t, as shown in the proof of proposition 1. Using the solution for
output in the labor demand and prot equations, equilibrium work e¤ort and real prots
are written as ht = 1=(1 + ) and t = mt=[(1 + )]. Corollary 1 indicates that when the
CIA constraint does not bind Zt (Mt + t)  1 which implies that t  .
(ii) Dene the right hand side of (10) as Zt such that Zt  1t. In section 2.1, it is shown
that
ct =
yt
nm
(A.2)
The aggregate output equation, yt = nxt, can be solved for ht using the rms production
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function:
ht =
yt
nmt
(A.3)
Then, using A:2 we can substitute out yt from A:3 and express ht as a function of consump-
tion, ht = ct=t. Finally, using the latter, (8) and the markup equation, we can substitute
out ht, (1t + 2t) and wt from (12):
ct =
t

h
1 + 
Zt(Mt+t)
i
Thus, Zt, in e¤ect, is the nominal peg that determines household consumption, and also all
time t variables. Let
t =

Zt (Mt + t)
so that ct =
t
(1 + t)
, ht =
1
1 + t
, yt =
nmt
1 + t
, t =
yt
n
and using the quantity theory equation we can solve for the price level:
Pt = (1 + t) q
b

Mt + t
t

(A.4)
The markup and labor demand equations along with (8) and (9) imply
1t =
nm
(   1)Pt [nmt   yt] > 0 and 2t =
(   1) [nmt   yt]  nm
h
Mt
Pt
+ t
Pt
i
(   1) [Mt + t] [nmt   yt] > 0
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which indicate that
Pt > q
b

Mt + t
t

and Pt > (1 + ) qb

Mt + t
t

, (A.5)
respectively. Then, (A:4) and (A:5) imply that t >  > 0. It is straightforward to show
that t is unique. Given t, t and 't, and probability distributions #,  and  since Zt 
Etfuc(ct+1; lt+1)=Pt+1g where
uc(ct+1; lt+1)
Pt+1
=
8>><>>:
qb
q(t+1;t+1;'t+1)
1
(Mt+1+t+1)
for (t+ 1) 2 NB
1
Mt+1+t+1
for (t+ 1) 2 B
(A.6)
the value of Zt, and thus the value of t is unique.
Proof of corollary 1. The euler condition implies that Zt (Mt + t) = qb=qt when the
CIA constraint does not bind and Zt (Mt + t) = =t when the CIA constraint binds. As
shown in the proof of proposition 1, when the CIA constraint does not bind qb  qt and
thereby Zt (Mt + t)  1 or Zt  (Mt + t) 1 = Zt. As shown in the proof of proposition 2,
when the CIA constraint binds t >  and thereby Zt (Mt + t) < 1 or Zt < (Mt+t)
 1 = Zt.
Proof of corollary 2. When t 2 NB and the CIA constraint weakly binds 2t = 0.
Then, the Euler condition becomes Zt (Mt + t) = 1 which implies that  = t (see denition
of t in proposition 2). Finally, corollary 1 indicates that qt = q
b.
Proof of proposition 3. (i) Let unb (t2) 2 Unb = fu (t): t 2 NBg and ub (t1) 2
U b = fu (t): t 2 Bg correspond to nb (t2) and b (t1), respectively. For any  we know that
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nb ()   < b (). Then, for a given , as b () decreses, b () ! nb () and ub () !
unb (). If ub () increases (decreases) as b () decreases (increases) then unb (t2) > u
b (t1).
To show this write
ub
 
;b

= ln
   1
 (1 + b)
 +  ln
b
1 + b
,  < b
Since 0 <  < b, it follows that
dub (;)
db
=
  b
b (1 + b)
< 0
and thereby unb (t2) > u
b (t1). In addition, since 0 <  < 
b,
b (t1) =
m
 (1 + b)
t1 <
m
 (1 + )
t2 = 
nb (t2)
(ii) From (i), since dub (;) =db < 0 and db (;) =db < 0 it follows that for t1 = t2
and t1 > t2, u (t2 ;t2) > u (t1 ;t1) and  (t2 ;t2) >  (t1 ;t1).
Proof of proposition 4. For 1 and 2 the corresponding upper bounds of velocity
are denoted by qb (1) and q
b (2), respectively. Proposition 1 indicates that if 1 > 2
then qb (1) < q
b (2). Then, B2(T )  B1(T ), for given #,  and . It follows that
limT!1P(B2; T ) = {2  limT!1P(B1; T ) = {1.
Proof of proposition 5. Recall that Zt = Etfuc (ct+1; lt+1) =Pt+1g where uc (ct+1; lt+1) =Pt+1
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is as shown in A:6. Hence, when t 2 NB,
 t+1R
M
t+1 =
8>><>>:
q(t;t;'t)
q(t+1;t+1;'t+1)
Mt+t
Mt+1+t+1
for t+ 1 2 NB
q(t;t;'t)
qb
Mt+t
Mt+1+t+1
for t+ 1 2 B
and when t 2 B
 t+1R
M
t+1 =
8>><>>:
qb
q(t+1;t+1;'t+1)
Mt+t
Mt+1+t+1
for t+ 1 2 NB
Mt+t
Mt+1+t+1
for t+ 1 2 B
Given t, t and 't, and probability distributions #,  and , if t (1) 2 NB, it cannot be
the case that either t (2) 2 NB because E2t

 t+1R
M
t+1

< E1t

 t+1R
M
t+1

= 1 or t (2) 2
B because E2t

 t+1R
M
t+1

> 1. Assuming that # and  remain unchanged under both 1
and 2, the only way that the Euler equation holds is when t (2) 2 NB which occurs when
the conditional probability distribution  has more mass on the left tale. In other words,
1 rst-order stochastically dominates 2. Likewise, given t, t and 't, and probability
distributions #,  and , if t (1) 2 B, it cannot be the case that either t (2) 2 NB because
E2t

 t+1R
M
t+1

< 1 or t (2) 2 B because E2t

 t+1R
M
t+1

= or > 1. Assuming that # and 
remain unchanged under both 1 and 2, the only way that the Euler equation holds is when
t (2) 2 B which occurs when the conditional probability distribution  has more mass on
the right tale. In other words, 2 rst-order stochastically dominates 1.
Proof of proposition 6. At the steady state the Euler equation, (10), implies that
 = b1=(b1 + b2). It follows that as long as  2 (0; 1), b2 > 0 which means that the CIA
constraint strictly binds.Using the steady state versions of the markup equation, (8), (9) and
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(10), the steady state ratio of consumption to leisure can be written as
bc
1  bh =    1 (2  )b (A.7)
Using the steady state versions of the markup equation and the wealth constraint (6), the
ratio of consumption to work e¤ort can be written as
bcbh =    1 b (A.8)
Then, A:7 and A:8 can be solved for bc and bh:
bh = 1
1 +  (2  ) (A.9)
bc =    1

bhb (A.10)
It follows that for  2 (0; 1), bh < 1=(1 + ) = h. Since y = nx and  = y=n, by and b can
be written as by = nmbhb and b = by=n. Finally, using A:9 and A:10 along with the quantity
theory of money, bP by = bqnmcM and the CIA constraint, bP = cM=bc, the steady state price
level can be written as bP = bq(cM=b)[1 +  (2  )] where bq = qb.
Proof of proposition 7. We prove (i) and (ii) simultaneously. From (11), t 2 B
means that
Ptct
Pt+1ct+1
<
1

(A.11)
where Ptct =Mt+t. There are two possible cases for t+1: (1) t+1 2 B and (2) t+1 2 NB.
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(1) When t+ 1 2 B,
Mt + t
Mt+1 + t+1
=
1
(Mt+1 + t+1) = (Mt + t)
=
1
Mt+2=Mt+1
=
1
1 + gMt+2
<
1

or gMt+2 >    1. Therefore, (i) when t 2 B and t + 1 2 B then gMt+2 >    1 and (ii) if
t+ 1 2 B and gMt+2     1 then t 2 NB .
(2) When t + 1 2 NB, Pt+1ct+1 = (qt+1=qb) (Mt+1 + t+1) where qt+1  qb. Then, A:11
implies
Mt + t
Mt+1 + t+1
qb
qt+1
=
1
1 + gMt+2
qb
qt+1
<
1

Since qt+1  qb then, 1=(1 + gMt+2) < 1= or gMt+2 >    1. Therefore, (i) when t 2 B and
t+ 1 2 NB then gMt+2 >    1 and (ii) if t+ 1 2 NB and gMt+2     1 then t 2 NB.
From (1) and (2), it follows that (i) when t 2 B then gMt+2 >    1 and (ii) when
gMt+2     1 then t 2 NB. Since gMt+2 = (1 + gvt+1)[1   Mt=(Mt + vt)] conditions
gMt+2 >    1 and gMt+2     1 can be written as gt+1 > [(Mt + t)=t](   1)   1
and gt+1  [(Mt + t)=t](   1)   1, respectively. These conditions can also be written
as t+1 > (Mt + t)(   1) and t+1  (Mt + t)(   1). What is left is to show that (i)
gMt+2 >  1 does not always imply that t 2 B, and (ii) t 2 NB does not always imply that
gMt+2     1: (i) It is enough to nd a case where for gMt+2 >    1, t 2 NB. Condition
gMt+2 + 1 >  can be written as
Mt + t
Mt+1 + t+1
>
1

(A.12)
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when t 2 NB and t + 1 2 NB then, the ratio of consumption expenditures between period
t and period t+ 1 can be written as
Ptct
Pt+1ct+1
=
 
qt=q
b

(Mt + t)
(qt+1=qb) (Mt+1 + t+1)
=
1

(A.13)
which is the state of condition (11) when the CIA constraint does not bind. Condition A:12
is consistent with condition A:13 when qt+1 > qt. Since the latter is possible we found a
case where gMt+2 >    1 does not imply t 2 B. (ii) Likewise, to show that t 2 NB
does not always imply that gMt+2     1, it is enough to nd a case where for t 2 NB,
gMt+2 >    1. If t 2 NB and t + 1 2 NB then (11) becomes A:13. If qt+1 < qt then this
implies that (Mt+ t)=(Mt+1+ t+1) < 1= which is equivalent to gMt+2 >   1. Since this
is possible, we found a case where t 2 NB does not imply that gMt+2     1.
Proof of corollary 3. For any T 2 Z+ [ f0g and  2 (0; 1),M>(T ) = ? as long as
for all t  T + 1,  1 < gMt+2     1. For any T 2 Z+ [ f0g and  2 (0; 1), it is perfectly
possible thatM(T ) = ? since Mt > 0 for all t  T + 1. Therefore, for gMt+2 >  1 with
t  T + 1, ?  M(T ) and ?  M>(T ). Let Z+(T ) = fT + 1; T + 2; ::1g such that
Z+(T ) = M(T ) [M>(T ). Note that (i) if eB(T )  Z+(T ) then ?  gNB(T ) and (ii) if
gNB(T )  Z+(T ) then ?  eB(T ): (i) This is trivial since proposition 6 and its proof indicate
that gNB(T )  Z+(T ) which implies ?  eB(T ). (ii) From the fact that ?  M(T ) and
proposition 6 we know that eB(T )  Z+(T ) which implies ?  gNB(T ). Notice that the
zero-ination steady state is a case where NB = ?.
Proof of proposition 8. The only di¤erence between the equilibrium of the economy
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with certainty and the equilibrium of the economy with uncertainty is the fact that in the
economy with uncertainty t holds in expectation. As shown in the proof of proposition 2,
the Euler equation becomes

t (Mt + t)
=
8>><>>:

(Mt+1+t+1)
qb
qt+1
for t+ 1 2 NB

Mt+1+t+1
for t+ 1 2 B
(A.14)
Then, A:14 can be solved for t.
Proof of corollary 4. Using proposition 7, for any t 2 NB
(1 + gct+1) =
8>><>>:
(1 + gt+1) for t+ 1 2 NB
(1 + gt+1)
1+
1+t+1
for t+ 1 2 B
Since t+1 >  for t+ 1 2 B (proposition 8), then for any t 2 NB, gct+1  gt+1.
Proof of proposition 9. (i) For any t 2 NB, the euler equation becomes (1+gpt+1)(1+
gct+1) = . Then, from corollary 4 we know that when t 2 NB then
gpt+1  
1 + gt+1
  1 (A.15)
However, the reverse does not always hold: when t 2 B and t + 1 2 NB then, 1 + gct+1 =
(1 + gt+1) [(1 + t)=(1 + )] where t > . The latter implies that gct+1 > gt+1. Then
from the euler equation we know that if t 2 B and t + 1 2 NB then A:15 holds with strict
inequality. When t 2 B and t + 1 2 B, 1 + gct+1 = (1 + gt+1) [(1 + t)=(1 + t+1)]. Then,
for t 2 B and t+ 1 2 B, t < t+1 =) gct+1 < gt+1 and t  t+1 =) gct+1  gt+1. Thus,
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for t 2 B and t+1 2 B we can nd t and t+1 such that t > t+1 so that A:15 holds with
equality.
(ii) We have established that for any t 2 NB, A:15 holds. The latter implies that when
gpt+1 <

1 + gt+1
  1 (A.16)
then t 2 B. However, t 2 B does not always imply A:16. As shown above, for t 2 B and
t + 1 2 B we can nd t and t+1 such that t > t+1 so that A:15 holds with equality. In
addition, for t 2 B, t+ 1 2 B and t < t+1, A:15 holds with strict inequality.
Proof of corollary 5. Condition (11) indicates that (t  1) 2 NB if and only if
gpt =

1 + gct
  1 (A.17)
otherwise (t  1) 2 B and
gpt >

1 + gct
  1 (A.18)
(i) When (t  1) 2 NB and t 2 NB then, gct = gt and A:17 becomes
gpt =

1 + gt
  1 (A.19)
To show that the reverse does not always hold, it is enough to nd a case where A:19 holds
and either t 1 or t or both =2 NB. Suppose that both t 1 and t 2 B. Then, A:18 becomes
gpt >

1 + gt
(1 + gt)  1 (A.20)
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In this case, A:19 is consistent with A:20 as long as gt < 0 which is feasible.
(ii) If (t  1) 2 NB and t 2 B then 1 + gct = (1 + gt)(1 + )=(1 + t). Using the latter
in A:17, we obtain
gpt =

1 + gt
1 + t
1 + 
  1 (A.21)
Since t > , A:21 implies gpt > [=(1 + gt)]  1. To show that the reverse does not always
hold, it is enough to nd a case where A:21 holds and either both t 1 and t 2 B or t 1 2 B
and t 2 NB. Suppose that both t  1 and t 2 B. Then, A:21 is consistent with A:20 as long
as gt < [(1 + t)=(1 + )]  1 which is feasible.
(iii) If (t   1) 2 B and t 2 B then, gpt > (1 + t 1)=[(1 + gt)(1 + t)]   1 which
implies that either gpt > [=(1+ gt)]  1 or gpt  [=(1+ gt)]  1 depending on the value of
(1 + t 1)=(1 + t). Likewise, if (t  1) 2 B and t 2 NB then, gpt > (1 + )=[(1 + gt)(1 +
t 1)] 1 which implies that either gpt > [=(1+gt)] 1 or gpt  [=(1+gt)] 1 depending
on the value of (1 + )=(1 + t 1).
Proof of corollary 6. (i) If (t  1) 2 NB and t 2 NB, Proposition 8 and corollary 5
(i) indicate that
1 + gpt =
(1 + gqt)(1 + gMt+1)
(1 + gt)
(A.22)
and 1 + gpt = [=(1 + gt)], respectively. Combining the two, A:22 reduces to
gMt+1 =

1 + gqt
  1 (A.23)
However, A:23 does not always imply that (t   1) 2 NB and t 2 NB. Suppose that
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(t  1) 2 NB and t 2 B. Then, proposition 8 and corollary 5 (ii) indicate that
1 + gpt =
(1 + gqt)(1 + gMt+1)
(1 + gt)
1 + t
1 + 
with t >  (A.24)
and 1 + gpt > [=(1 + gt)], respectively. Using the latter in A:24, we obtain 1 + gMt+1 >
[=(1 + gt)][(1 + )=(1 + t)]:Since t > , it could be the case that A:23 holds.
(ii) If (t   1) 2 NB and t 2 B, it is shown in (i) that either gMt+1 > [=(1 + gt)]   1
or gMt+1  [=(1 + gt)]   1, depending on the value of (1 + )=(1 + t). Proposition 8
and corollary 5 (iii), imply that if (t   1) 2 B then, gMt+1 > [=(1 + gt)]   1 or gMt+1 
[=(1 + gt)]  1 for any t.
Proof of Proposition 10. (i) and (ii) follow from Proposition 7 and corollary 4 under
the assumption of an inationary steady-state. To establish (iii), note that (given g = 0)
gc > 0 if gp <    1, hence no steady-state with gc = 0 exists.
Proof of corollary 7. It follows from Propositions 3(i) and 10(ii).
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